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SUPREME NEGLECT OF TEXT AND HISTORY 
William Michael Treanor* 
SUPREME NEGLECT: How TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR 
PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Richard A.  Epstein. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2008. Pp. xiv, 1 69.  $ 19.95 . 
INTRODUCTION 
Since his classic book Takings' appeared in 1985, Richard Epstein's2 
ideas have profoundly shaped debate about the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause3 to a degree that no other scholar can even begin to approach. His 
broad, original, and stunningly ambitious reading of the clause has power­
fully influenced thinking in academia, in the judiciary, and in the political 
arena. The firestorm of controversy that followed the Supreme Court's re­
cent decision in Keio-in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a municipal urban renewal plan that displaced long-time 
homeowners and conveyed their land to developers4-is in critical part a 
testament to the way in which the intellectual framework and normative ar­
guments pioneered and championed by Professor Epstein have entered, not 
just the mainstream of legal thought, but the mainstream of politics. 
In Supreme Neglect, Epstein has produced a clear and elegant synthesis 
of his lifetime of thinking about the Takings Clause and, more broadly, 
about the role of property in our constitutional system. In a book con­
sciously aimed at a popular audience (p. xvii), Epstein advances his view 
that strong protection for private property must be a core value of our consti­
tutional system because that was the conception of the Framers, because the 
constitutional text dictates such protection, and because strong protection 
for private property safeguards liberty and advances general economic well­
being. For Epstein, the Takings Clause is the Constitution's primary mecha­
nism for protecting private property against government overreaching. He 
argues that, if courts read the clause correctly, they will not only invalidate 
much land-use regulation, the area involved in most takings litigation today, 
but also the statutory regimes that create the modern regulatory state. In es­
sence, for Epstein, the Takings Clause bars government from acting in ways 
* Dean and Paul Fuller Professor, Fordham Law School. 
I .  RICHARD A .  EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO­
MAIN ( 1 985) [hereinafter TAKINGS]. 
2. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Director, Law and 
Economics Program, The University of Chicago Law School. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation."). 
4. Keio v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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that diminish the value of private property (with the exception of a highly 
constrained category of police-power regulations). 
Under modem Supreme Court caselaw, the Takings Clause constrains 
government actions in two ways. First, it bars the government from physi­
cally "taking" private property (as when it uses the power of eminent 
domain to acquire property for schools or roads) unless compensation is 
provided5 and unless the taking is for a public benefit.6 Second, it prevents 
"regulatory takings"-regulations that go "too far"7 in diminishing the value 
of private property without providing compensation. Although Supreme 
Court decisions do not reflect a consistent position on precisely when regu­
lations go so "far" in diminishing value as to constitute a taking, only 
dramatic diminutions in value have been found to go "too far."8 
Epstein sees the clause as a dramatically more powerful limitation on 
government. According to Epstein, the Takings Clause is a "twelve-word 
distillation of social contract political theory" (p. 34). The just­
compensation principle that the clause embraces ensures that the individual 
will not suffer when his or her property is taken. Central to Epstein's posi­
tion are the notion that "[t]he use of compensation . . .  prevents any single 
individual or small group from being 'singled out' for special adverse treat­
ment, for the cash paid is meant to be a perfect equivalent of the property 
surrendered" (p. 32) and his belief that "forced transactions" resulting from 
"the use of state power . . .  should yield proportionate gains to all individu­
als" (pp. 32-33). This principle of proportionate gain accords with "intuitive 
grounds of fairness" (p. 33). It also promotes efficiency, a point on which 
Epstein places great stress: 
Forcing the government to supply proportionate gains necessarily shrinks 
the level of factional intrigue . . . .  [S]truggles [to win a disproportionate 
share of the gain from governmental actions] cost a lot of time and money 
to wage, generating backstabbing and conflict along the way. The com­
bined effect of these political maneuvers is to eliminate much of the . . .  
gain that the social project originally promised. The proration requirement 
offers an effective way to counter that risk . . . .  (p. 33) 
Epstein applies this principle of proportionate gain to a wide range of doc­
trinal areas. He would, for example, carefully scrutinize government actions 
to determine whether they satisfy the "public use" requirement of the Tak­
ings Clause, rather than applying the deferential standard of review of 
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 4 1 9  ( 1982). 
6. Keio, 545 U.S. 469. The public benefit standard is, in practice, easily satisfied. 
7.  Pa. Coal Co. v .  Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 4 15  ( 1 922). 
8. For an analysis of Mahon, see William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reas­
sessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 8 1 3  ( 1 998). For more recent cases involving 
regulatory takings, see Penn Central Transponation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 1 04 ( 1 978), a 
decision upholding the designation of Grand Central Station as a landmark and the leading example 
of a deferential view of the constitutionality of government regulations, and Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 ( 1992), a decision finding beachfront regulation to a be a taking­
the leading example of a decision reflecting a more aggressive standard. For further discussion, see 
infra Part II. 
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"public use" reflected i n  the Court's decision i n  Keto. Even when compensa­
tion is provided, takings to advance an urban renewal project would pass 
constitutional muster "only when the loss in subjective value is small and 
the locational necessities are great" (p. 85). He argues that rent control is 
unconstitutional, as well, because of its disproportionate impact, benefiting 
current renters while disadvantaging everyone else (p. 73). The Supreme 
Court's determination in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.9 that zoning 
is constitutional similarly runs afoul of the proportionate-advantage rule, 
since the zoning ordinance that the Court upheld made some property own­
ers big winners and others big losers (pp. 1 17-19). Endangered species 
legislation also runs afoul of the Takings Clause because such legislation 
"converts the discovery of any valuable species on private lands from a 
source of new wealth to its owner into a mortal threat to the land's produc­
tivity" (pp. 133-34). To take yet another example, progressive taxation 
(definitionally) also fails to pass muster under the principle of proportionate 
gain (pp. 167-68). 
Epstein's vision of the Takings Clause thus narrowly circumscribes gov­
ernmental action. He allows government to prevent property owners from 
engaging in common law nuisances since common law nuisance law re­
flected the principle of reciprocity: "each person will gain more from these 
restrictions imposed on others than he will suffer when like restrictions are 
imposed on him" (p. 23). Thus, the regulation is permissible because it 
benefits property owners in general. He also allows rate regulation to the 
extent it is necessary to end monopoly profits: rate regulation permissibly 
limits "the natural monopolist [such as the railroad owner] to competitive 
prices" (p. 1 5 1 ). Here, regulation is permissible to the extent it addresses a 
situation of market failure. In general, however, compensation is mandated 
if the individual has not gained proportionally from governmental action, 
and the strict public-use requirement bars some governmental actions even 
when compensation is paid. 
The real question posed by the book, however, is not what the propor­
tionate-gain approach entails, but whether it is constitutionally mandated. 
Epstein makes two arguments here. One argument is historical: he claims 
that the Takings Clause should be understood to embody the Founders' con­
ception of the inviolability of private property. The second argument is 
textual: he contends that a proper reading of the words of the clause would 
lead courts to the view that government cannot diminish property value (ex­
cept in very limited circumstances). The remainder of this Review will be 
devoted to these arguments. I will argue that proper regard for the Framers' 
conception and constitutional text-the two primary anchors of Epstein's 
theory-leads to a limited amount of judicial protection for private property; 
original understanding and constitutional text indicate that the purpose of 
the Takings Clause is simply to provide compensation in cases of govern­
ment seizure of property, a position dramatically different from Epstein's. 
More broadly, if one were to apply the text according to the original 
9. 272 U.S. 365 ( 1926). 
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meaning of the words or to follow the concrete understanding of the found­
ing generation, one would reject not only Epstein's approach to the clause, 
but the entire modem regulatory-takings doctrine. 
I. HISTORY AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
With respect to history, Epstein 's account is a story of decline. The sub­
title itself, "How to Revive Constitutional Protection for Private Property," 
embodies the notion that we have lost what we once had-adequate protec­
tion for private property-and that we must recover what we have lost. The 
halcyon days were the days of the Framers, the moment in which we de­
parted from the original understanding was the New Deal, and the culprit 
was the Supreme Court. It is the Court's disregard of the Framers' vision 
that is the "Supreme Neglect" the book addresses and seeks to remedy. 
This point-that the Framers put forth a Constitution that provided 
strong protection for private property, while the New Deal Supreme Court 
led us astray-is announced at the very beginning of the book in Professor 
Geoffrey Stone's Editor's Note: "Over the past seventy years, the Supreme 
Court has abandoned the strong version of the takings clause championed by 
the framers of the Fifth Amendment in favor of the much weaker version of 
the clause advocated by early twentieth-century Progressives and supporters 
of the New Deal" (p. xii). Epstein restates the point in his autobiographical 
preface, in which he describes how, at the outset of his career, he came to be 
interested in the Takings Clause: 
When I completed my legal studies in the United States, the study of 
American constitutional law loomed large. Immediately, I was struck with 
the major transformation from the property-protective regime that had 
been championed by the framers of our Constitution to the weak property 
regimes championed by the Progressive politics of the early twentieth cen­
tury, which were turned into constitutional law during the New Deal. 
(p. xvi) 
He returns to the point in his Introduction as he states the purpose of the 
book: 
Our founding fathers had a keen appreciation of the central role of private 
property in social life, which is why they included the "takings clause" in 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .  The evident 
partiality for l imited government that animates that provision has not held 
firm throughout our nation's history. Indeed the revolution of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's New Deal was made possible by the conscious choice of the 
United States Supreme Court to make sure the takings clause did not ham­
per or overturn any of Roosevelt's comprehensive legislative reforms, 
which imposed greater government control over the nation's economic ac­
tivity . . . .  The purpose of the book is to offer a roadmap for the revival of 
property rights in the United States and for the social improvement that 
this constitutional change should usher in. (p. 2) 
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Epstein thus proclaims with enthusiasm and vigor that recovering the vi­
sion of the Framers is his basic mission. And yet the actual Framers are 
almost literally absent from the book. To be precise, the following is a com­
plete enumeration of all references to individual Framers in Supreme 
Neglect: Madison is mentioned once, in passing. Madison appears as the 
sole American (along with four Scottish and English writers) on a list of the 
"key writers who set the intellectual framework for our Constitution . . .  
[who] all treated private property as a bulwark of the individual against the 
arbitrary power of the state."10 That's it. There is no discussion of Madison's 
thought, not even a mention of anyone else involved in drafting or ratifying 
the Constitution or the Takings Clause, no discussion of drafting or ratifying 
history, and no mention of the circumstances that gave rise to the Takings 
Clause. Epstein has fairly extensive discussions of the role of private prop­
erty in the thinking of John Locke (pp. 6, 17-18, 27, 29-30), William 
Blackstone (pp. 6, 1 8-19, 90), David Hume (pp. 6, 27), and Adam Smith 
(pp. 6, 18 ,  30, 3 1 ,  167), but (with the exception of including Madison's 
name on a list), no Americans figure in Epstein's analysis of the original 
understanding. 
The ideological background of the founding generation was complex. 
While thinkers such as Locke and Blackstone were part of that background, 
so was a republican worldview, descended from English opposition thought, 
in which the purpose of the state was seen as promoting virtue and in which 
the individual pursuit of self-interest was decried. 1 1  As the Founders thought 
through questions of private property, this approach often manifested itself. 
Thus, at the Constitutional Convention, delegate John Dickinson declared 
that he "doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a 
veneration for wealth" and "had always understood that a veneration for 
poverty [and] virtue[] were the objects of republican encouragement." 12 
Similarly, Benjamin Franklin observed, "Private Property . . .  is a Creature 
of Society, and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessi­
ties shall require it, even to its last Farthing." 13 Given the competing 
ideological influences shaping the thought of the founding generation, 
Epstein's account is irretrievably flawed because he simply cites one set of 
influences (and does so in a very broad-brush way) while ignoring both 
competing influences and the way in which the Founders worked through 
concrete problems. 
10. P. 6. The others who established the intellectual framework for the Constitution are John 
Locke, David Hume, William Blackstone, and Adam Smith. P. 6. 
1 1 .  For further discussion of the argument briefly advanced here, see William Michael 
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 782, 8 1 9-25 ( 1 995). 
1 2 .  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 787, at 1 1 8, 123 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1 966). 
1 3 .  Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania ( 1 789), in IO THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (Albert Henry Smyth 
ed., 1 907). 
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The omission of analysis of the Framers is not a product of the fact that 
Supreme Neglect is a quasi-popular book. Rather, it reflects Epstein's disre­
gard for what the Framers thought (although he claims to be their 
champion). Takings, his primary scholarly book on the Takings Clause, 
takes precisely the same approach as Supreme Neglect. It has a chapter fo­
cusing on the views of specific British thinkers-"Hobbesian Man, Lockean 
World"14-yet Hamilton is the only Founder to earn even a mention, and the 
reference to him is in passing and not concerned with the Takings Clause. 1 5  
Looking at English and Scottish thinkers associated with classic liberalism 
(with Locke having the pride of place), Epstein finds historical basis for a 
view of property that includes the "rights to use, transform, develop, con­
sume, or dispose of property," as well as the right of "exclusion" (p. 20), and 
that has the dual goals of serving "as a bulwark of the individual against the 
arbitrary power of the state" (p. 6) and promoting economic gain (p. 1 9). 
Yet, as Epstein develops his historical claims, there is no attention to how 
Americans of the founding generation and the generations before the found­
ing grappled with both the level of protection to be afforded private property 
and the limits on that protection. I am willing to accept that Locke was a 
strong champion of private property (although the extent of the protection 
he would have afforded private property is a subject of debate among aca­
demics). That fact, however, is of limited relevance to an inquiry about the 
original understanding of the Takings Clause. Epstein's originalism is irre­
trievably flawed because it is originalism without Americans. 
Epstein might respond to this critique by arguing that his concern is with 
the original meaning of the text, not the original understanding of the people 
who wrote and adopted that text, and that his approach is textualist. 16 That 
claim, however, is belied by his repeated invocation of the Framers-which 
reflects the view that what they thought matters and that he is claiming their 
mantle-and by his invocation of Locke, Hume, and other British think­
ers-which suggests that background is relevant to understanding text. 
Indeed, Epstein writes :  "[T]o figure out what these words [of the Takings 
Clause] mean[,] we must tum to extrinsic material that runs the gamut from 
popular usage to historical practice and learned commentary" (p. 5). But his 
use of background understanding omits centrally important evidence. 
While Epstein's vision of the Takings Clause bars both physical seizures 
of property by the government and regulations that diminish the value of 
property, the few precursors to the Takings Clause were all concerned only 
with physical seizure. Even this point should be placed in context: Takings 
clauses were generally not present in colonial-era documents of govern­
ment, and, prior to the Fifth Amendment, there were many instances of 
14. TAKINGS, supra note I, at 7- 1 8. 
15 .  Id. at 1 7. 
1 6. See, e.g. , p. 6 ("In dealing with the takings clause, we have to track the text."); p. 39 
("[T]he acid test is . . .  [whether courts] have . . .  read constitutional terms in accord with their ordi­
nary usage at the time of their adoption, as elucidated-and here is the rub-by traditional 
principles of interpretation."). 
April 2009] Supreme Neglect 1 065 
uncompensated takings. 17 The clauses that existed were limited in scope to 
seizure. The Magna Carta prohibits a crown official from "tak[ing] the com 
or other chattels unless he pays on the spot cash for them."18 Similarly, the 
only colonial charter to have a takings provision was the 1 641 Massachusetts 
Body of Liberties, which provides that "[n]o man[']s Cattel or goods of what 
kinde soever shall be pressed or taken for any publique use or service" with­
out compensation. 19 The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which 
John Locke drafted but which never fully went into effect, was also concerned 
with physical seizures, requiring compensation when the colonial government 
built structures and constructed highways on private land. 20 
The handful of revolutionary-era takings clauses were also limited to 
physical seizures. Vermont's 1 777 Constitution provided "[t]hat private 
property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it; 
nevertheless, whenever any particular man's property is taken for the use of 
the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money."21 While we 
have no legislative history for the clause, the contextual evidence from 
Vermont's history sheds light on the drafters ' intent. Vermonters had de­
clared their independence from New York after the New York governor had 
invalidated the New Hampshire land claims on which most land claims in 
what became Vermont rested. 22 The Vermonters were thus rebelling because 
of a government action that took away their land and gave it to others. The 
takings clause ensured that, in the future, the state government could not 
deprive property owners of their land in this way because it barred the state 
from transferring land from one individual to another without compensa­
tion.23 The Massachusetts Constitution of 178024 and the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1 78?25 both had takings clauses that used language suggesting 
1 7. For further discussion, see Treanor, supra note 1 1  at 787-9 1 .  
1 8. KATHERINE FISCHER DREW, MAGNA CARTA 133 (2004) (translated from Latin). (Al­
though the chapters of the original text were unnumbered, this chapter is conventionally numbered 
28 in modem discussions of the original text.) A broader provision of the Magna Carta mandates 
adequate procedure, without requiring compensation. Id. at 1 34 (chapter conventionally numbered 
39) ("No free man shall be . . .  disseised . . .  except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the 
law of the land."). 
1 9. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 164 1 ,  § 8, reprinted in I THE COLONIAL LAWS 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 29 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1 889). 
20. Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina of 1 669, art. 44, reprinted in JOHN LOCKE PO­
LITICAL ESSAYS, at 1 60 (Mark Goldie ed., University Cambridge Press 1 997) ( 1 669) ("The Damage 
the Owner of such Lands (on or through which any such publick thing shall be made) shall receive 
thereby, shall be valued, and Satisfaction made by such ways as the Grand Council shall appoint."). 
2 1 .  VT. CONST. o f  1 777, Declaration of Rights, art. 2. 
22. Treanor, supra note 1 1 ,  at 827-30. 
23. Id. 
24. MASS. CONST. of 1 780, Declaration of Rights, art. X ("[W]henever the public exigencies 
require, that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor."). 
25. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the River Ohio 
(Northwest Ordinance of 1 787), ch. 8, art. II, I Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) ( 1 789) ("[S]hould the public 
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concern with impressments of goods by the military, and the relevant early 
caselaw (the most relevant history) supports the reading that the clauses 
were limited to physical seizures.26 
Thus, whereas Epstein pictures Framers who had a strong conception of 
the inviolability of private property, the actual historical record is more nu­
anced. As we have seen, most state constitutions did not bar uncompensated 
takings; where there was a requirement of compensation, it was limited to 
physical seizures. This does not mean that the founding generation did not 
see the protection of private property as of fundamental importance. It does 
mean that they were aware that government actions could affect property 
and its value and that, outside of the context of physical seizures, they did 
not want a bright-line rule that would prohibit important governmental ac­
tions in the absence of compensation; it also means that, even in the area of 
physical seizures, support for an inviolable compensation principle was lim­
ited. 
Not surprisingly given this background, there was no demand that a tak­
ings clause be included in the Bill of Rights. Of all the clauses in the Bill of 
Rights, it alone was not requested by a state ratifying convention.27 
Epstein writes: "Our founding fathers had a keen appreciation of the 
central role of private property in social life, which is why they included the 
'takings clause' in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution" 
(p. 2). This suggests a broad-gauged historical movement coalescing around 
the necessity for the clause, but the reason why we have a takings clause is 
simpler: when he proposed the Bill of Rights, Madison included a takings 
clause. There is no surviving history of debate among members of the Con­
gress or the state legislatures about what the clause meant. Perhaps the most 
relevant evidence is found in the first constitutional law treatise, in which St. 
George Tucker in 1803 suggested that the clause "was probably intended to 
restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the 
army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently prac­
tised during the revolutionary war."28 Madison, in his private writings, 
indicated another area in which the clause would have effect: it would re-
exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to 
demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same."). 
26. Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 1 32-33 (La. 1 8 1 6) (holding that the Northwest 
Ordinance only mandated compensation when a person's property or services were used to advance 
the war effort); Callender v. Marsh, 1 8  Mass. (I Pick.) 4 1 8  ( 1 823) (requiring no compensation for 
consequential damages); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. ( 1 1 Met.) 55 ( 1 846) (requiring no 
compensation to owner barred from taking sand and gravel from his land). For further discussion, 
see Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 830-32. 
27. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL Of RIGHTS: AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 1 6 1-63 
( 1 957) (listing sources for the amendments). 
28. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Appendix to I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES I ,  305-06 
(St. George Tucker, ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1 803). As Tucker 
suggested, property owners whose goods had been impressed by the military during the Revolution­
ary War did not have a judicially enforceable right to compensation for these losses. See Respublica 
v. Sparhawk, I Dall. 357, 362-63 (Pa. 1 788) (finding no right to compensation for goods seized by 
the military during Revolutionary War). 
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quire compensation if the national government were to abolish slavery. 29 
Neither writing suggests that the clause covered regulations.30 
The early caselaw on the just-compensation principle, primarily in state 
courts interpreting state constitutions, is to the same effect: the clause did 
not encompass regulations.3 1  Treatise writer Theodore Sedgwick wrote in 
1 857:  "It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection under 
this clause, the property must be actually taken in the physical sense of the 
word."32 The protection provided in federal courts was limited in another 
way. Until after the Civil War, only Congress, and not the courts, could re­
solve claims for takings payments.33 
In sum, one of Epstein's central claims-that he is reviving the Foun­
ders' vision of the Takings Clause-is completely unfounded. His book's 
textual argument is equally flawed and is considered next in Part II. 
II. ThXTUALISM AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Epstein states that following the text of the clause is an imperative: "In 
dealing with the takings clause, we have to track the text" (p. 6). His textual­
ist argument begins, quite correctly, by looking at constitutional text and the 
key terms of the Takings Clause: "What do we mean by 'private property' ?  
How i s  it 'taken' ?  What i s  'just compensation '?  And what i s  a taking 'for 
public use '?" (p. 39). 
So far, so good. A textualist approach to the Takings Clause that answers 
these questions leads to the same place as the originalist approach outlined 
above: regulation falls outside of the scope of the Takings Clause. While the 
government has to pay the property owner when it physically "takes" her 
property for a public use, in contrast, it does not have to pay compensation 
when it bars her from using it in a certain way because, under both eight­
eenth-century and current usages, it has not "taken" her "property."34 To use 
an example I have used before: If I tell my daughter Katherine that she 
29. Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1 8 19), in THE MIND OF THE 
FOUNDER 3 1 5  (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 198 1 ). For further discussion, see supra note 26 and 
accompanying text. 
30. See James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1 792, reprinted in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 266, 267 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1 983) (using the Takings 
Clause principle that no property "shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnifica­
tion to the owner" as reflecting support for "the inviolability of property" and criticizing 
Hamiltonian economic policies for their failure to reflect the same support for the inviolability of 
property). Thus, for Madison, the clause reflected a larger principle and had significance beyond its 
legal scope, which was limited to direct takings. Treanor, supra note 1 1 ,  at 838-39. 
3 1 .  Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 792-94. 
32. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETA­
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 1 9  (New York, John S.  
Voorhies 1 857). 
33. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution 
From a legislative Toward A Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA . L. REV. 625, 627-64 ( 1 985). 
34. For further development of this argument, see William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633 (2008). 
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cannot play with her ball in the apartment, she will not accuse me of having 
"taken" her ball (or of having "taken" anything else, for that matter). She 
has been deprived of something of value to her: there is nothing she likes 
better than playing ball in the apartment. But we don't think of this prohibi­
tion as a taking of property. The Supreme Court has recognized the 
regulatory-takings doctrine for over one hundred years, but a committed 
textualist, like a committed originalist, sees this line of precedent as an error. 
Epstein's textualism, however, ultimately rests on non-textual concerns 
and moves him dramatically away from the plain-language textual approach 
above. After enumerating the four questions addressing the "key terms of 
the takings clause" (p. 39)-"What do we mean by 'private property' ?  How 
is it 'taken'? What is 'just compensation' ? And what is a taking ' for public 
use' ?" (p. 39)-he adds "it would be a grievous error to assume that these 
textual questions, critical as they are to the overall enterprise, constitute the 
entire picture" (p. 39). He then introduces "two key nontextual principles of 
interpretation" (p. 39) which he says are "wholly consistent with the rule of 
law . . .  [and] an integral part of a uniform interpretive tradition since the 
days of the Bible" (p. 39). 
One is 'justification": the government can intervene to prevent harms 
without providing compensation; Epstein conceives of this power narrowly, 
equating it with unauthorized entry onto private property and nuisances (p. 
42). More significant for Epstein's analysis is the second non-textual factor, 
the "anticircumvention principle": the government cannot "circumvent [the 
prohibition's] literal language in ways that undermine its broad purpose" (p. 
40). This non-textual principle is the key to Epstein's conception of the Tak­
ings Clause exercise. 
In a critical passage on anticircumvention and its scope, Epstein notes 
the textualist argument that "[i]n its ordinary sense, the term 'taking' re­
quires dispossession of property" (p. 98). His response is not to counter with 
a textualist argument of his own, but to move through a series of analogies. 
First, he observes that "the categorical refusal to compensate regulatory tak­
ings has been rejected even by writers who think that the historical and 
textual evidence confines the takings clause to physical occupations" (p. 
98). This is a surprising argument for a scholar such as Epstein to make: the 
positions he advances were novel when he made them, so a claim that no 
one today would limit the Takings Clause to physical occupations should 
not have a great weight with him, if that is what the text and history (but not 
the precedent) would warrant. 
In any event, he then moves through a series of analytic steps that lead 
him to his broad reading of the clause. He offers the example of a regulation 
that takes away all the property owner's rights except the right to exclude. 
"Surely, courts should invoke the anticircumvention principle to stop this 
abuse, for nothing in principle requires or allows for the artificial separation 
of occupation from land-use regulation, when both wipe out [the property 
owner's] value in his land" (p. 99). In other words, a regulation that is tan­
tamount to a physical occupation should be treated the same as a physical 
occupation would be: compensation is owed. He then moves from a 
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regulation affecting one property owner to a regulation of broader effect and 
argues that they should be treated the same way: "the law cannot erect an 
iron wall between restrictions directed toward a single person and those di­
rected toward many people" (p. 99). Earlier in the book, Epstein had made 
the argument that government acts that affect a particular right in the bundle 
of sticks are as much takings as acts that affect all of them: "[I]magine that 
the bundle of rights in a piece of land-in space, over time, and against 
neighbors-is a salami. Any slice of that salami is still salami, so that the 
state has to pay for each slice of salami it cuts for itself, no matter how thin" 
(p. 46). This same approach is now applied in the regulatory-takings con­
text: "[T]he central analytical inquiry asks whether the pattern of benefits 
generated by the government matches its dislocations, be they large or 
small. If it does, the measure is constitutional. If not, then it is prima facie 
unconstitutional" (p. 99). Everything else Epstein argues for follows. Gov­
ernment acts under which some individual or group of individuals does not 
receive proportionate gain-whether zoning rules, or environmental statutes, 
or progressive taxation, or any of a host of other statutes-are unconstitu­
tional. 
It is hard to think of a better example of the tail wagging the dog. As the 
historical discussion above indicates, the Takings Clause did not originally 
apply to regulations, and the text itself is clear: the government cannot 
physically take your property for a public use without paying for it. The 
clause itself was sought by no one other than Madison, and, although there 
is no legislative history for it, the leading constitutional scholar of the early 
republic, St. George Tucker, thought it was intended to require compensa­
tion when the military impressed goods during wartime.35 But, by deftly 
moving through a series of analogies, Epstein transforms this clause of lim­
ited scope into a prohibition on the regulatory state. 
III. TEXT, HISTORY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Epstein's thesis is that the Supreme Court has "supreme[ly] neglect[ed]" 
the history and text of the Takings Clause. In the previous sections, I have 
shown that, in fact, Epstein himself disregards the text as the founding gen­
eration understood it and he disregards history. At a fundamental level, 
however, I agree with Epstein: I also think the Supreme Court caselaw de­
parts from the text and the history, and in this final section I would like to 
explore that insight, very briefly. 
The Supreme Court first embraced the position that a regulation could 
be a taking in 1 898 in the case of Smyth v. Ames.36 The central controversy 
in modem caselaw concerns how broadly to read the regulatory-takings doc­
trine. The leading pro-regulation case is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City, in which a closely divided Court upheld a New York City 
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
36. 1 69 U.S. 466 ( 1 898). For discussion of Smyth and its place in the caselaw, see Treanor, 
supra note 8, at 837. 
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land-use regulation that cost the owners of Grand Central Station a mini­
mum of three million dollars a year (and gave them in return only 
transferable development rights of indeterminate value).37 The leading case 
reflecting a much more searching analysis is Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.38 While the regulation at stake in Lucas deprived the prop­
erty owner of all value of his property, Justice Scalia's opinion indicates that 
some regulations taking all value from discrete property interests­
individual sticks in the bundle of sticks-will be compensable takings.39 As 
we have seen, Epstein would push the doctrine of regulatory takings even 
further. 
My textual and historical analysis above indicates that this dispute is be­
side the point. Neither the text nor the history supports the view that 
regulations can be takings. The text of the Takings Clause and the early his­
tory limit it simply to physical seizures by the government-situations 
where the government physically "takes" property by, for example, building 
a road or a school on it. So, under this analysis, the whole regulatory-takings 
doctrine-and the century-long line of precedent that reflects it-is a mis­
take. 
Of course, not everyone is an originalist or a textualist. One can legiti­
mately disregard the text and the original understanding and embrace the 
regulatory-takings doctrine because of respect for precedent or because she 
sees the protection of private property as a fundamental value in our consti­
tutional system that merits protection beyond that provided for by the text or 
history. But if one applies the text in accordance with the original meaning 
of the words or if she wishes to apply the concrete understandings of the 
founding generation, she will reject the whole idea of regulatory takings.40 
CONCLUSION 
Supreme Neglect powerfully highlights the costs of government regula­
tion and the ways in which logrolling and the power of special interests 
both dissipate the benefits of government action and cause the government 
to act even when the action occasions more harm than benefit. Such argu­
ments can have great influence politically. At the outset of this Review, I 
37. 438 U.S. 104, 1 1 6 ( 1 978) (proposed use would have provided property owner three 
million dollars in rent annually); id. at 1 37 (holding that, while the transferable development right 
may not have been "just compensation" if there had been a taking, they "undoubtedly mitigate 
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken 
into account in considering the impact of regulation"); see also id. at 1 4 1 ,  1 5 1-52 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (questioning whether the transferable development rights were adequate compensation 
and indicating that the case should have been remanded to determine the adequacy of compensa­
tion). 
38. 505 U.S. 1003 ( 1 992). 
39. Id. at 10 16  n.7. 
40. Another approach would be to "translate" the underlying concerns of the founding gen­
eration into a modern context. I have used this approach in arguing for a process-based approach to 
the Takings Clause. Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 873-88. That approach, however, is not a texrualist 
approach or an attempt to interpret the clause to reflect the concrete understandings of the Founders. 
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mentioned the outcry that followed the Supreme Court's decision in Keio: as 
Epstein notes, by early 2007, thirty-four states had enacted statutes or con­
stitutional provisions designed to prevent the use of urban renewal plans to 
seize private property and convey it to developers (p. 3). But Supreme Ne­
glect is principally a book of constitutional law, not a book of public policy, 
and the metrics on which Epstein relies-history and text-dramatically 
undercut his thesis. History and text indicate that the clause is concerned 
only with physical seizures by the government. For more than one hundred 
years, the Supreme Court has held that some regulations run afoul of the 
Takings Clause. But one who embraces the constitutional commitments to 
text and history that Epstein espouses should reject this line of precedent, 
rather than seeking to expand it dramatically in the way that Epstein does. It 
is fair to say that the modem Court's takings jurisprudence "supreme[ly] 
neglect[ s ]" the text and history of the Takings Clause. But the same criticism 
is equally applicable to Epstein. Epstein would dramatically expand the 
scope of the Takings Clause beyond that provided under current caselaw. 
Serious regard for text and history would, however, dramatically move the 
law in precisely the opposite direction. It would lead to rejection of the prin­
ciple that regulations are takings within the meaning of the Takings Clause 
and it would limit the clause to mandating compensation for physical tak­
ings for public use. 
